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Veiled Waters: Examining the Jones Act’s Consumer Welfare Effect 
Justin Lewis, Tulane University 
 
In the United States, one of the most influential laws affecting the nation‟s transportation 
infrastructure is the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, more commonly known as the Jones Act. In 
essence a protective tariff, it dictates that all waterborne cargo shipped between domestic ports- 
known as cabotage - be handled exclusively by U.S. built, owned, and crewed vessels. With the 
sheer scope and volume of trade under this umbrella, the Act wields considerable influence over 
several aspects of the economy. Its original intentions are clear: to strengthen the domestic 
shipbuilding industry, protect employment in merchant marine trades, guarantee a requisition-
able fleet for purposes of national defense, and provide for enhanced security in seaports.  
There is considerable debate, however, as to whether the Act is beneficial or detrimental 
to the country on the whole. This is largely because, as of yet, there is not a body of literature 
containing quantifiable insights into each of its costs and benefits. Thus, I do not seek to make a 
definitive assessment of the Jones Act, but rather to contribute to our understanding of how its 
trade regulations influence the cost of US coastal shipping and impact consumer economic 
welfare. This information is a necessary stepping-stone toward an informed, holistic policy 
evaluation. 
In this paper, I estimate how the price level of domestic cabotage services would differ if 
the Jones Act were not in place. The difficulty in this effort lies in the nature of the Act itself. 
Since foreign unregulated competition in US cabotage is prohibited, there is no preexisting set of 
„free market‟ prices in this market to serve as a basis of comparison. In addition the price of 
unregulated, foreign flag transport in the world market is essentially unobservable due to a series 
of peculiar characteristics unique to the maritime shipping industry, and attempting to estimate it 
is one of this paper‟s primary tasks. In doing so, I adopt a shadow pricing method that simulates 
the removal of Jones Act compliance costs from the cost structures of firms wishing to 
participate in the domestic trade. My approach adapts data from several key sources. Rate 
aggregate calculations derived from current Maritime Administration and Bureau of 
Transportation statistics are used to frame the market conditions for domestic water transport. 
Historical financial statement data and Robert Morris & Assoc. market research is then applied 
to formulate a representation of firms‟ operating profit structures. Finally, Jones Act compliance 
incidence levels are accounted for. The resulting picture of the domestic and global shipping 
markets allows me to examine how a change in operating costs influences the price charged for 
shipping. The difference between the “repeal scenario” price of coastal transport and that 
observed in the existing market is then used to generate a lower-bound estimate of Jones Act‟s 
impact on consumer economic welfare. From there, I adapt measures of market elasticities from 
the International Trade Commission‟s Computable General Equilibrium Model in generating 
several key back-of-the-envelope estimates of what my own result may mean in a broader 
context.  
 My principal finding indicates that, without the Jones Act in place, coastal water 
transport in the United States would be approximately 61% cheaper and that consumers using 
these services would stand to gain a minimum of  $578 million annually in economic benefit1. 
                                                        
1
 When I consider the ITC model‟s implied elasticity of demand for this market, the actual 
amount of consumer welfare gains to result from a repeal of the Jones Act appears to be closer to 
Issues in Political Economy, 2013 
 81 
This result represents a new contribution to the understanding of this legislation‟s consequences. 
My simulated repeal applies actual Jones Act vs. „free market‟ compliance cost differential data -
that has only recently become available- in generating a more precise estimate of price level 
effects than was possible in past inquiries. The presentation of my findings also differs from that 
seen in the bulk of research concerning the Jones Act. Thus far, most analyses have framed a 
singular aspect (usually whichever one the respective study focused on) as the principal factor to 
be considered in forming a determination of the Jones Act‟s value and relevance in today‟s 
society. I frame my results within the context of the Act‟s considerably large scope, and my 
discussion acknowledges how they relate to the interests and perspectives that have kept the 
legislation in place for almost a century. Nonetheless, I believe that the potential gains to 
consumer welfare described shown by my analysis provide an argument for a movement toward 
liberalization of the United States‟ coastal shipping trade.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the domestic merchant marine 
infrastructure and the legal environment it operates in. Section 3 reviews the existing body of 
research relating to the Jones Act and transportation deregulation. Section 4 describes my 
methodology and presents the key findings. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of my results 
and their potential implications for domestic waterborne transportation policy. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
The following subsections describe the context of the Jones Act. The first outlines its 
legislative history, while the second details the marine shipping industry and the Act‟s role 
within it. 
 
A. Legal Foundation and Revisions     
 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 was instituted for the purpose of regulating cabotage 
(water transport of goods between domestic ports) in a way that ensured the future health and 
viability of the U.S. merchant fleet
2
. By restricting the transport of goods from one domestic port 
to another, the Congress reasoned, United States shipbuilding and maritime transport industries 
would be shielded from cheaper foreign competition and able to maintain market presence and 
employment. This is clearly stated in the Act‟s Introduction: 
 “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, that it is necessary for the national defense and for the 
proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a 
merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to 
carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in 
time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by 
citizens of the United States; and it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United 
States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
$685 million per annum. Similarly, resulting welfare losses to other players in the economy can 
be seen as relatively negligible.   
2
 Another key component of the Act is its creation of laws governing the rights of American 
seamen. This paper will address the Act only as it restricts the ability to participate in the 
cabotage industry to vessels built, flagged, crewed, and built in the United States.  
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such a merchant marine, and, in so far as may not be inconsistent with the express 
provisions of this Act, the United States Shipping Board shall, in the disposition of vessels 
and shipping property as hereinafter provided, in the making of rules and regulations, 
and in the administration of the shipping laws keep always in view this purpose and 
object as the primary end to be attained (Merchant Marine Act of 1920).”  
 
 Upon its‟ enactment, however, it became apparent that domestic operators were 
consequentially disadvantaged by the requirement of paying relatively higher domestic prices to 
operate their vessels. In an attempt to mitigate this, Congress responded with the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936, creating an “operating differential subsidy” as well as a “construction 
subsidy”3 for qualifying domestic firms. The descendant of this bill is found in the Maritime 
Security Act of 1996, in the form of the Maritime Security Program (MSP), which “provides a 
fixed retainer payment to US-Flag vessel owners in exchange for providing the DOD with access 
to their vessels…during times of war.” (PwC & MARAD, 2011) shows that, like its predecessor, 
the MSP is insufficient to close the gap between US and Foreign-Flag operating costs: 
                    
(MARAD, 2011)   
Unfortunately, before the Jones Act‟s economic consequences cost could be observed in 
peacetime, the onset of WWII drove a dramatic increase in government-commissioned and 
private sector demand for vessels and crews such that the size of the merchant marine reached its 
all time peak capacity of some 24,000 vessels in 1940, and the percentage of American 
commerce transported under the domestic flag reached the highest level (~43%) to be seen for 
the following eighty years. PwC (2011) demonstrates the steady decline in the size of the US 
Merchant Marine since the end of WWII, a trend that was not acknowledged until long after the 
damage had been done.  
                                                        
3
 Both of which were repealed in the 1990‟s 
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                                                                                                      (MARAD, 2011) 
There was, however, a significant cabotage repeal effort in the mid 1990‟s. Preliminary 
studies by the ITC coupled with a new Republican majority led to the formation of the Jones Act 
Reform Coalition “JARC” to “promote shipper interests” (Papazinas & Gardner, 2009). 
Domestic maritime interests (in particular, the Seafarer‟s International Union) put pressure on 
pro-Jones Act members of Congress to retaliate. As a result, the Maritime Cabotage Task Force 
“MCTF” was former in order to combat the JARC‟s legislation aimed at dismantling the 
cabotage law. The JARC‟s proposals did not gain sufficient Congressional support, and cabotage 
law remained untouched. The Open America‟s Waters Act of 2010, introduced by Sen. John 
McCain, also sought to repeal the Jones Act. It too received heavy opposition from the MCTF, 
and was eventually tabled in the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Library 
Of Congress, 2012). 
 
B. Industry Structure 
 
Coastal shipping and inland shipping (barging) are the two sectors that operate under the 
Jones Act‟s governance. However, this study concerns only the coastal4 trade. Inland shipping in 
the United States is considered to be commercially robust and competitive, and thus not viewed 
as a logical candidate for deregulation (Lane, 2011)
5
. Unlike in the inland trade, where prices are 
determined by the matching of daily demand with supply capacity, cabotage rates are set 
individually for each specific route and type of commodity a firm can service. As such there is 
not a going rate for a set amount of freight being transported a set amount of miles. For this 
                                                        
4
 The term “coastal” also encompasses freight shipped across domestic ports in the Great Lakes.   
5
 Not only because there would be scarcely any economic welfare gains to be had, but also 
because the use of inland waterways is wisely restricted to domestic firms in the interests of 
national security. 
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reason, an analysis of the entire coastal shipping market requires that rates be examined in the 
aggregate.   
Another key component of the maritime shipping trade is the longstanding practice of 
flagging, which refers to the status a ship holds when registered in a given country. Each nation 
has its own respective flagging regulations and privileges, which greatly influence where global 
firms register their fleets. Not surprisingly, the flags that afford ships the greatest liberty and 
least regulatory oversight -Panama and Liberia- are by far the most popular (Smith, 2004). 
Nevertheless, some foreign firms do choose to register a portion of their fleet under the US-flag 
in order to be eligible for lucrative Department of Defense military preference cargo and the 
MSP retainer payments in exchange for agreeing to requisition part of their fleet to the US in 
times of war.  
There are four core groups that comprise the maritime shipping trade in the United States: 
 
 US Owned, Foreign Flag vessels are subject only to the operating restrictions imposed 
upon them by their flag of registry, and carry global cargoes.  
 US Flag, Foreign Owned (not pictured) vessels are subject to the compliance costs 
specific to the US-Flag of registry and operate occasionally in international waters, but 
specialize in carrying large volumes of US military preference cargo. 
 US Owned, “Foreign Trade” vessels are subject to the compliance costs specific to the 
US flag, but forgo the additional build requirement necessary for being Jones Act 
eligible. They to specialize in military preference cargo. 
 US Owned, Jones Act trade eligible vessels are subject to both US-flag specific and 
Jones Act-specific operating restrictions. They operate solely between domestic ports.  
 
The composition of this market is illustrated below (2011):  
 
        (Statistical Snapshot, 2011)  
 
This paper concerns the lattermost fleet on this list, which is comprised of the 98 vessels 
with Jones Act trading privileges (though as cited by Smith, (2004) and others this number has 
been steadily declining for several decades).  
Other significant trends currently facing the Jones Act industry include increasing prices 
for cabotage services, as well as decreases in coastwise fleet size and total tonnage transported. 
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These are illustrated in the consolidated table below, with data taken from the US Maritime 
Administration: 
 
Industry 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Coastwise Trade Volume 
(Million Metric Tons) 
200.1 193.8 183.2 186.7 169.0 152.2 
 
Number of Oceangoing Jones 
Act Vessels 
 
106 
 
105 
 
102 
 
97 
 
96 
 
98 
 
Coastwise Transport Producer 
Price Index (PPI) 
 
100.0 
 
110.1 
 
119.7 
 
131.6 
 
137.6 
 
131.6 
US Water Transport Statistical Snapshot, 2011 
 
Since the Jones Act requires that all its‟ participating vessels be registered under the US-
flag, they are thus subject to all of the following US-flag specific regulations as well as those 
spelled out in the Jones Act. These regulations generate compliance incidences that are borne by 
participating firms as part of their operating cost structure, defined by Stopford (1997) as:  
 
[Operating Costs = Crew+ Stores/Lubes (Fuel) + Maintenance &  
 Repair+ Insurance+ Overhead]  
 
Though the amount of individual compliance requirements is extensive and often housed 
in a complex legal vernacular, they can be shown to fall generally within the above named cost 
structure items
6
 and generate the following consequences (PWC, 2011): 
 
 Crew: The use of domestic mariners, who require compensation, social benefits (tax 
levels), and working conditions commensurate with a much higher standard of living 
than foreign counterparts, is mandated. This results in crewing expenditures being 
roughly 5.8 times higher on Jones Act vessels. 
 Maintenance & Repair: Jones Act vessels are required to be repaired & maintained at US 
shipyards, whose services are more costly than at foreign yards. This results in M&R 
costs being roughly 1.3 times higher on Jones Act vessels.  
 Insurance: Protection & Indemnity insurance (that covers crew and cargo risk) is much 
higher for firms that employ US mariners, as their personal injury liability is much 
higher than in other countries. This results in insurance costs being roughly 2.1 times 
higher for Jones Act vessels.  
 Overhead:  Costs related to shore-based employment. Domestic expenditures in this area 
are higher likely due to the higher levels of regulatory compliance „labor‟ handled by 
shore-based offices. This results in such costs being roughly 1.7 times higher for Jones 
Act vessels.  
 
                                                        
6
 Store/Lube (Fuel) costs are essentially equivalent for Jones Act and foreign markets.  
It should also be noted that what the Jones Act build requirement effects is a capital expenditure. 
Instead of being considered an „operating cost‟, it is reflected in the price level of domestic 
transport services as part of the profit margin a firm requires to maintain loan payments.    
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The higher costs associated with Jones Act transport are purely a product of its regulatory 
environment and closed-market status. There are no significant differences in the quality of 
domestic vs. foreign flag service, and they can thus be viewed as perfect substitutes (Lane, 2011). 
   It is also necessary to separately acknowledge the domestic shipbuilding industry, that -
as stipulated in the Jones Act build requirement- provides the most important source of capital 
inputs to coastwise shipping. Due to a series of factors examined in Gray (2008), this industry 
has experienced consistent declines in output and employment, as well as soaring prices of its 
products for the last two decades. Due to the capital-intensive nature of marine shipping, these 
rising prices have had particularly negative consequences for the domestic fleet operators 
required by law to face them. Though this may seem to indicate a form of market failure, the 
argument is often made that the Jones Act build requirement is still on the whole beneficial in the 
way that it protects a relatively small, but lucrative base of employment in American yards from 
cheaper foreign competition. It is worth noting, however, that the volume of this „lucrative base‟ 
of domestic shipbuilding is most heavily concentrated within a handful of massive yards 
dedicated to the construction of military vessels on contract from the government (Bollinger, 
2011). Though I do not analyze the shipbuilding market or its labor force directly, its already 
well-documented characteristics are of great use in supplementing my findings and providing 
insight into what the economy could look like without the Jones Act.    
Worthy of reiteration is the Act‟s well-documented responsibility for increases in 
operating costs (Whitehurst, 1998 and PWC, 2011) and overall costs of providing transport 
within this industry (ITC, OECD). Findings along these lines have lead to a sizable amount of 
political discourse focusing upon how the Jones Act may be influencing price level inflation for 
industries dealing with specialty goods shipped to and from Hawaii and Alaska, since they are 
the two areas that rely most heavily upon Jones Act trade for transporting goods produced in the 
contiguous US (Jackson & McKetta, 1986). Geographic and sub-sector analyses addressing these 
types of questions have yielded some of the most enlightening results, but an overall 
quantification and judgment of the Jones Act will not be possible until additional research into 
each of the Act‟s different spheres of influence augments the existing body of research.     
   
II.  LITERATURE 
 
This current body of research on the Jones Act is relatively limited, and a great deal of 
room for further inquiry remains. The following section serves to preface my investigation by 
acknowledging the previous studies that have contributed the most to a better understanding of 
this legislation and its consequences.   
 
A. Fundamental Studies 
 
Papazivas & Gardner (2009), a legal study, is perhaps the best place to start. Interestingly, 
this paper did not address questions of the Act‟s costs and benefits. Rather, it examined whether 
repealing the Act would facilitate any changes to the coastal shipping market at all; many 
cabotage supporters have argued that the Jones Act merely restates the laws that already apply to 
all other forms of intrastate commerce. If so, global transportation rates would not prevail in a 
liberated market, and there would be no reason to examine any of the Jones Act‟s economic 
effects for anything other than an academic exercise. 
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 The paper engaged in a detailed historical analysis of cabotage and interstate commerce 
laws in the United States from George Washington‟s second address to Congress in 1790 
through present day. After doing so, it concluded that the Jones Act does indeed go above and 
beyond standard interstate commerce law in its imposition of domestic build, citizen crew and 
operation regulations. Additionally, the Act fails to apply many existing intrastate laws to the 
coastal shipping industry. This finding is significant in showing that, though many legal details 
could vary in a repeal scenario, a world price level for ocean transport could feasibly supplant 
that of the current Jones Act market.     
 Although some initial inquiries were made into to the viability of the government‟s 
direct subsidy programs, Jantscher (1975) conducted the first formal analysis of U.S. maritime 
economic policy. This paper reached meaningful conclusions regarding direct subsidies. Using a 
rudimentary cost-benefit analysis, it demonstrated that said subsidies were ineffective at 
restraining costs faced by domestic operators, as increases in subsidy levels could not keep up 
with the rapid growth in labor costs. (This analysis was likely influential in the direct subsidy 
program‟s eventual repeal in the 1990‟s). Additionally, Jantscher (1975) provided a thorough 
industry blueprint that is still the foundation for studying maritime economic policy in the United 
States. Insights were also gleaned into tax incidences faced by domestic firms, military cargo 
allocation and its role in maintaining the industry‟s “skeleton” demand, national security 
arguments, and private firms‟ cost structure formulas (later formalized in Stopford, 1988). 
Indeed, my own analysis draws heavily upon this blueprint. 
 
B. The National Defense Question 
 
After the end of the Cold War, the relevance of maintaining a military requistion-able 
merchant marine fleet came into question. The main figure in formally analyzing this was 
Clinton Whitehurst, a transportation economist who delved into the optimization of wartime 
logistics and supply chain infrastructures. By the time that his work became published, it was 
generally understood (though not yet examined) that the Jones Act did indeed raise the costs of 
domestic transport. The question remained: is the Act worth leaving in place for its military 
benefits, or is it failing in both of its original objectives?  
Whitehurst (2001) not only measured the United States‟ (then) current marine shipping 
capacity, but also estimated the necessary size of it for the military to adequately face a cohort of 
worst-case scenarios. Using game theoretic intuition, it also modeled a probability distribution of 
the government‟s likelihood of being able to charter sufficient foreign flagged transport in the 
cases of conflicts fought in various areas of the globe. The conclusions this paper arrived at are 
surprisingly far-reaching, and have had a marked impact on how the „defense component‟ of the 
Jones Act is currently understood.  
The first, and most intuitive of these conclusions is that the United States faces two 
options in providing an adequate infrastructure: to augment the stock of government-owned 
general cargo vessels and meet potential excess demand with foreign charters, or to restructure 
and expand federal government support for the domestic merchant marine such that there would 
be “little to no reliance on foreign flag ships”. Both of these options are very expensive. The 
paper‟s remaining conclusions suggested an adoption of the latter, along with an improvement of 
the competitive environment in which domestic vessels operate, citing several strategies to 
ensure provisions for wartime contingencies. These strategies were presented in essentially two 
categories. One included incremental/marginal changes such as: increasing Title XI government 
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funding for domestic shipbuilding yards
7
, providing continued support for the Cargo Preference 
Acts
8
, allowing accelerated asset depreciation schedules for US firms and those with EUSC
9
 to 
defer taxes on profits that are re-invested into their business.  
The other category contained more institutional reforms. Here, the conclusion prescribed 
an aggressive policy of pursuing international legislation to “level the playing field” of 
worldwide ocean transport. If the International Labor Organization was to institute updated wage 
and living standards, Whitehurst (2001) argued, operating cost differentials would likely 
decrease and the US fleet would gain a more robust position in the marketplace. Were this to 
take place, there would be significantly less dependency on foreign flagged transportation and a 
decrease in the United States‟ vulnerability to world market volatility in wartime.  
This paper thus concluded with an appeal for a compromise between opposing private 
sector interests
10, acknowledging the Jones Act‟s economic weaknesses and the need for further 
analysis and action while still confirming its importance as a defense measure. The conclusion 
deemed that this compromise is needed for the construction of for a new long-term maritime 
policy: the subject of Whitehurst‟s other major work in this area. 
Whitehurst (1998) provided an economic discussion of how to best increase the 
efficiency of the domestic water transportation industry while minimizing dependence on foreign 
charters. The main conclusion arrived at is: the forming of government-subsidized multimodal 
transport companies
11
 would be better able to take advantage of the massive economies of scale 
prevalent in larger, foreign flagged operations. In order for this to be successful (competitive), 
however, the paper cited the need for alterations
12
 to the build requirement stipulated in the Jones 
Act. If permitted to use foreign-manufactured components in the construction of their vessels, 
both American yards and the firms that purchase their ships would have a healthier cost structure. 
Additionally, Whitehurst (2011) called for the –now in place- deregulation of international ocean 
shipping. The argument cited that deregulation would provide a potential multimodal 
infrastructure with the opportunity to provide lower service rates and encourage the formation of 
global shipping alliances. If these conditions are met, and a long-term legislative and financial 
commitment it is made to establish multimodal logistic pipelines, it is concluded that a repeal of 
the Jones Act would be inevitable and likely be of benefit to American firms and consumers, 
while strengthening domestic defense capabilities.   
 
C. Quantifying the Jones Act 
 
At the close of the twentieth century, the time had long since come for a serious empirical 
evaluation of the economic costs and benefits of the Jones Act. This need was acknowledged, 
                                                        
7
 To increase their capacity as well as bolster overall financial health, with the now widely cited 
rationale that this would be “crucial if the US faced war with Asia.” 
8
 Which guarantee that at all cargo shipped at the expense of the military is carried by US 
flagged vessels, and that all other government-impelled cargo is offered first to them as well.  
9
 Effectively United States Controlled Ship 
10
 Those advocating a repeal of the Jones Act and those who support it 
11
 In which ocean shipping is “but a part” of the system 
12
 Ad-hoc, before any actual cabotage reform takes place 
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and the project undertaken privately at first in 1996 by economists
13
 at the International Trade 
Commission (ITC), and then repeated more extensively in 2002 by the ITC itself in its‟ official 
report “Impact of Significant Import Restraints.”  
In this report, the ITC modified their preexisting Computable General Equilibrium Model 
(CGE) to include domestic coastal water transport services. The model itself used data on all 
known monetary transactions within the economy (Social Accounting Matrix) and on the use of 
specific quantities of factors of production and inputs in the production of each specific 
good/service (Input-Output Matrix) in order to generate interactive supply and demand curves 
for each economic agent. Then, the model solved for an equilibrium structure of the entire 
United States economy.
14
 This extremely data-intensive and interactive technique allowed the 
ITC to capture a wide range of economic impacts resulting from the „shock‟ of opening the Jones 
Act to foreign competition.   
Specifically, this study focused on how a repeal of the entire Jones Act or solely the build 
requirement would affect equilibrium price levels, quantities, and employment in coastal 
shipping and closely related industries. The model provided the ITC with relatively 
straightforward comparative-static estimates of this that served to compare these variables of 
interest in their 1999 (the year of their most recent data) state with an estimate of their long-run 
values after the designated policy change.  
The results generated by running the CGE model proved to be very compelling. In the 
case of a complete repeal, the ITC estimated a welfare gain of $656 million to the entire 
economy, as well as a 20.4% decrease in the composite price of coastal transport services. Not 
surprisingly, this corresponded to an estimated 84.1% decrease in domestic coastal transport 
employment and a 70% drop in its output. Perhaps most interestingly, this policy shift yielded 
only a 3.1% decrease in both domestic shipbuilding and output, and no significant change in the 
actual price of ships. This is logical given that the majority of the American shipbuilding 
industry‟s output is based on government contracts, and suggests that though its protection was 
one of the Act‟s original goals, the vitality of this industry is not very closely tied to the Jones 
Act.  
In its entirety, ITC (2002) is the most detailed and insightful inquiry into the Jones Act 
that has yet been made. However, it lacks enough complete information to paint a precise picture 
of how the Jones Act affects the economy. At the time of its publication, actual data did not exist 
on foreign flag vs. domestic compliance cost levels; the Maritime Administration provided their 
estimates but they had not been compared/audited against actual foreign-flag numbers. This 
comparison was only recently accomplished in (MARAD & PwC 2011), and is what will help 
drive my new –albeit much more limited- inquiry into how these compliance costs may translate 
into consumer welfare effects for the US.  
   
D. Sub-Sector Analyses 
 
In the construction of an economic analysis of the Jones Act, it is also useful to examine 
the contributions made in a series of papers that seek to quantify the Act‟s impacts on 
                                                        
13
 Francois, Arce, Reinert, et al. uses an essentially identical method as the 2002 ITC report, but 
presents much less detailed findings. I thus focus upon the 2002 report, but include insight 
gained from the 1996 paper.  
14
 With the aid of General Algebraic Modeling Software 
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geographically specific industries.  They have the distinct advantage of precise datasets and very 
focused scopes of inquiry, which allow for streamlined methodologies that lead to largely 
credible results.   
The first of these was a study of the Jones Act‟s effects upon the Alaska forest products 
trade, published in Jackson McKetta (1986). Their analysis was conducted in part to address 
speculation that the Jones Act is particularly harmful to the non-contiguous states (AK and HI) 
that rely heavily upon expensive cabotage services to import most of their consumption and 
capital goods. This paper approached an alternate facet of this speculation by investigating the 
consequences the Jones Act creates for non-contiguous states‟ main export industries (in this 
case, the Alaska forest products trade). In doing so, the authors estimated the effects of repealing 
the Jones Act build requirement
15
 upon this industry using a Partial Equilibrium Model.  
This Partial Equilibrium Model (PEM) was in essence an optimization model used to 
maximize Alaskan firms‟ unique rents for each commodity shipped from a supplier to each 
specific demand region (subject to regional derived-demand curves). The economic intuition this 
sought to test and quantify is: that repealing part of the Jones Act would presumably cause a 
rightward shift of the supply curves for each good shipped to each region, resulting in changes in 
quantity, price, and (potentially) trade patterns for each good. Before this could be possible 
however, there were key information requirements that needed to be satisfied.  
Unlike with the Gen. Equilibrium model used by the ITC, Jackson & McKetta (1986) 
sought to analyze the AK forest products trade in isolation, holding the remainder of the US 
economy constant. Thus, they needed to form an “industry” Input-Output Matrix containing 
price and quantity information on all factors of production (& shipping), for AK forest goods, as 
well as an “industry” Social Accounting Matrix holding data on market transactions in each 
region of interest. In dealing with a relatively small and cooperative industry this was 
accomplished without any mentionable difficulty, with the one (unsurprising) exception being 
the ability to obtain route and seasonally specific rate formulas from domestic marine shipping 
companies. Instead, they used government-aggregated rates as a substitute for actual market data 
in the Input-Output matrix.  
The task then came of determining the Jones Act vs. non-Jones Act rate differential 
estimates, which would be the basis of the „policy shock‟ to the status quo of the partial 
equilibrium. Fortunately, the relative magnitudes of transport price for each of the routes in 
question were calculated
16
 in a closely related study by Simat (1982). Jackson & McKetta 
needed only to apply these relative magnitudes to their aggregate Jones Act price levels for each 
route in order for the model to estimate a discrete difference in transport rates between the two 
scenarios.  
With all of the information in place, it was now possible for the authors to address their 
two main questions regarding a Jones Act partial repeal scenario: Would the resulting differences 
in goods‟ unit prices (marginal values) be enough to shift the destination/direction of trade? And 
what kind of welfare effects would result from changes in trade volumes‟ price and quantity? As 
it turned out, the results varied slightly for each good/market but were compelling when taken 
altogether. Estimated welfare gains for the entire market were practically split between producer 
                                                        
15
 Specifically, the entry of US-Flag, vessels not built in the US or owned by US firms 
16
 Simat used a cost-determined approach that compared component costs of actual Jones Act 
transport on these routes with non-Jones Act vessel component costs for the same route. These 
were then computed to a per-unit freight rate, and their relative magnitudes observed.     
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and consumer surplus at a respective $2.38 million and $2.39 million. Though lower transport 
costs facilitated lower prices for each sub-sector, goods did not exhibit a sensitivity to change 
market destinations. The authors qualified these results as indicating that altering the Jones Act 
could increase competitiveness improve service in the AK forest product trade in the long run.    
In a more qualitative approach, Magee (2002) discussed the potential consequences of a 
cabotage law reform upon the cruise ship/passenger vessel industry in the United States, with the 
goal of developing a strategy to improve that industry‟s competitiveness and increase passenger 
traffic. The paper treated both the Jones Act and the Passenger Services Act of 1886
17
 in a repeal 
simulation, and utilized a host of industry cost structure data in the development of several 
conclusions, namely that: domestic ports likely stand to observe significant increases in traffic in 
the case of a Passenger Services Act repeal, and that the waiving of the Jones Act labor and build 
requirements are key to the viability and growth of the domestic cruise ship industry. The 
elimination of operating cost differentials (resulting from higher domestic labor and shipbuilding 
prices) faced by vessels with coastwise passenger transport privileges and the inclusion of 
foreign firms in the coastwise trade would drive significant increases in port city employment, 
economic growth and tax revenue. This implication is noteworthy; though domestic open water 
maritime employment, which the Jones Act was originally designed to support, would likely fall 
in the case of a cabotage law repeal, overall cruise ship traffic in domestic ports was estimated to 
dramatically increase, and with it the levels of shore-based maritime employment.  
Also worthy of consideration is a study undertaken in Piggott (2002) that analyzed the 
effect of the Jones Act on soybean production in North Carolina. This paper is unique in its 
specificity, being the sole example in the literature focusing in upon such a very small market. 
This setting proved conducive to the creation of a realistic analytical framework, and the paper 
employed a clever spatial simulation model
18
 to estimate various effects of a Jones Act repeal. 
Piggott (2002)‟s conclusions are intriguing; if the Jones Act were to be repealed, an overall 
welfare loss for North Carolina producers would be observed (roughly equivalent to 1% of the 
state‟s total soybean annual soybean output), but an overall gain for the rest of the United States. 
This is attributed to the eradication of the price premium currently charged by NC producers, 
which currently serves as a fee to access in-state soybean products not faced with Jones Act 
transportation costs. This paper‟s results serve as an important reminder of the incredibly 
dynamic nature of the transportation industry, whose spatial nature includes many unforeseen 
(and not yet fully understood) economic interactions. Though impossible to account for all of the 
Jones Act‟s spatial interactions within the domestic transportation infrastructure, I will strive to 
incorporate the concept of such varied contingencies into the discussion of my findings.  
 
E. Related Regulations and Alternative Transport Modes 
 
Though no other component of the domestic supply chain infrastructure is –or was- 
regulated in exactly the same manner as the Jones Act, both the Trucking and Rail industries 
have undergone their own phases of mass deregulation whose consequences can facilitate a 
                                                        
17
 Dictating that all passengers transported to and from United States ports must be carried in 
domestically operated and built vessels. 
18
 Piggott‟s model uses elasticity estimates for soybean transportation supply/demand between 
North Carolina and Ohio in conjunction with the freight rate % changes estimated in the ITC‟s 
report (see p.8)  
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complementary understanding of how the relaxing of legislative constraints can impact economic 
conditions.  
Addressing the need for a comprehensive survey of global transport deregulation data, Li 
(2002) compared the effects of rate & entry restrictions and their subsequent removals upon the 
general economic outcomes across countries. The paper cited that in the US, Germany, and New 
Zealand similar types of these regulations led to higher rates, monopoly pricing, and less 
competition over time. Li (2002) also concluded that entry regulation led to the downfall of 
railroads due to substitution effects, and that though trucking entry regulation served to aide 
some operators, they were “certainly harmful to shippers and the economy as a whole.” The 
discussion of liberalization effects is extensive, but crux of Li (2002)‟s findings is that positive 
economic consequences were shown to be dramatic in terms of cost-savings, productivity, rates, 
service quality, and infrastructure (among others).     
OECD (1997) analyzed in detail the effects of Trucking (Motor Carriers Act of 1980) and 
Rail (Staggers Act of 1980) deregulation upon their respective markets for the period 1980-1997. 
In the case of Rail, “rate controls were relaxed, railroads were allowed to contract to provide 
specific services to individual firms and to enter into long-term contracts, and mergers and the 
abandonment of non-profitable branch lines became easier” (OECD, 1997). As a result rail 
freight rates declined approximately 1.5% annually in this period, and increased supply chain 
efficiency drove dramatic decreases in rail employment & miles of track, causing the mode to be 
“competitive with trucks and barges for the first time in decades. (OECD 1997).” An underlying 
theme in the successes of this deregulation is the “increased control over capital investment and 
disinvestment”: a quality noticeably lacking in the coastal cabotage industry due to the Jones 
Act‟s build requirements.  
The case of trucking deregulation is even more compelling. The Motor Carrier Act of 
1980 (MCA) “reduced barriers to industry entry, loosened restrictions on contract carriers… and 
permitted common
19
 carriers to raise or lower rates by 10% annually without regulatory 
interference.” Consequentially, the number of trucking firms tripled from its 1975 level, and 
industry employment increased by over 500,000 in the period 1980-1997 (OECD, 1997). In “The 
Winston (1990) estimated a $3 billion yearly increase in consumer surplus as a result of the 
reform. Ying (1990) showed decrease of 23% in the overall cost structure level of trucking firms 
over time. Indeed, this was sufficient enough for the Federal Trade Commission to declare in its 
1997 submission to the Ibero-American Competition Forum that “The United States now has had 
sufficient experience with deregulation of the trucking industry to conclude that it has been 
entirely beneficial for consumers. None of the concerns expressed by skeptics of deregulation 
have proven valid” (FTC, 1997). With regards to the Jones Act trade, it is also likely that 
removal of barriers to entry (flag & crew requirements) would be the driving force behind 
increases in consumer welfare. Given the successes of trucking reform, the question of potential 
benefits from cabotage deregulation is likely to remain pressing. This paper now proceeds in 
quantifying these benefits for consumers of coastal shipping services.  
 
 
    
                                                        
19
 The designations „Common‟ and „Contract‟ carrier refer to the general distinction between 
firms that operate on designated routes and are „for hire‟ to transport any commodity along them, 
and those that operate on a „per job‟ basis with no set routes. 
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III.  Theory and Methodology 
 
The goal of this study, generally speaking, is to use newly available foreign and domestic 
firm cost structure data to facilitate a clearer, updated understanding of what the Jones Act doing 
in the market for ocean transport. This section starts with a description of the intuition behind 
how I approach this, and proceeds to give a walk-through of my analysis. My endeavor matters 
because the Act still holds sway over a large yet deteriorating industry, whose future remains as 
of yet undetermined. Current information regarding how this maritime policy affects the welfare 
of the US economy is a necessary tool for ongoing discussions, and is what I now focus on 
providing. 
In proceeding, I argue that the main reason Congress would consider repealing the Jones 
Act is to enhance economic welfare for domestic firms and consumers; the premise of a 
requisition-able fleet for national defense purposes remains relevant, and domestic crew and 
shipbuilding unions have a strong interest in preserving the high-wage jobs supported by the Act. 
It follows that, if Congress were to take steps to repeal the Jones Act, it would seek a policy 
implementation designed to maximize the expected economic gains driven by lower price levels 
of domestic transport. I contend that this objective would be best accomplished by repealing the 
build and crew requirements, effectively opening the coastal trade to foreign flagged foreign 
owned fleets. These operate in a competitive, largely unregulated market that is free of the 
compliance cost constraints that burden vessels operating under the Jones Act and under the US 
Flag in general. The fostering of a liberated, US coastal transport market characterized by these 
conditions would plausibly result in a decrease in ton-mile rate levels for the services currently 
restricted to the Jones Act trade. The question is: how much would prices (and output) change, 
and what would that mean for economic welfare? 
The ideal way to seek out this answer would be through the use of a CGE model like the 
one used in ITC (2002).  Because a CGE accounts for the “nature of all existing economic 
transactions among economic agents”, it would allow me to estimate the resulting changes in 
equilibrium price and quantity of coastal transport as well as the distributive effects for every 
other sector (IBD, 2012). Welfare gains and losses from repealing the Jones Act could then be 
evaluated for the economy at large, effectively quantifying all of the Act‟s current economic 
consequences.  
Unfortunately, constructing such a CGE model for this purpose is not feasible given the 
amount of available real-world information. Though the formulation of a Social Accounting 
Matrix would be possible (if very time consuming) using data from the BEA‟s National Income 
Accounts, trouble arises when trying to prepare the Jones Act trade‟s entry into an Input-Output 
Matrix. The kind of comprehensive input cost structure information for domestic firms is not 
publically available, but is required for an accurate construction of the industry‟s Supply Curve. I 
thus cannot directly analyze how the equilibrium quantity of output (as well as economic welfare 
in other related sectors) might be affected by a repeal of the Jones Act. However, I do adapt 
some of the key comparative static results from (ITC, 2002)‟s CGE model in order to augment 
my principal finding.      
The available data on Jones Act as well as the foreign-flag trade is better suited for 
analysis with a Partial Equilibrium model. Holding all other sectors of the economy constant, and 
focusing in upon how a repeal of the Jones Act would affect the price level of cabotage services 
(quantity of output remaining fixed), I obtain an estimate of the lower-bound level of change to 
consumer surplus. That is to say: a change in equilibrium price level resulting from a repeal 
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multiplied by the original equilibrium level of demand [Q0 x P] can show the minimum amount 
that consumers of cabotage services stand to gain in terms of economic welfare (the total 
difference between what consumers are willing to pay and the total that actually is paid for 
coastal transport at market price).  
In theory, finding this lower-bound estimate would be a simple (even trivial) exercise of 
looking up the world price level of unregulated ocean transport and comparing it with that 
observed in the Jones Act trade. In practice, observing such a world price is nearly impossible for 
several reasons unique to this industry. Firstly, it is best practice to analyze maritime rates as 
measured per „ton-mile‟. This unit describes price level (correctly) as a function of both cargoes‟ 
weight and the distance it is transported. Unfortunately rates are not published in ton-mile terms, 
nor are their formulae published separately for the several thousands of different routes, seasons, 
and types of cargo. Though agencies such as Lloyd‟s List, Eurostat, ISL, and Platt‟s maintain 
extensive datasets on the amount of tonnage moving through different ports and channels (as 
well as the average price levels per ton), price levels per ton-mile are not retroactively calculable 
until data on total revenues from shipping operations as well as tonnage and mile quantities can 
be collected and aggregated. This is accomplished for the Jones Act trade by the US Army Corps 
of Engineers, which requires all of this information to be annually reported to the agency. Ton-
mile rates for the unregulated market are not available, likely because doing the same for the 
entire global foreign-flag fleet would be a colossal task, and require the collaboration of several 
nations‟ respective agencies. Thus, the aggregate price level of unregulated ocean shipping (in 
its most precise terms) is essentially unobservable. Indeed, even the International Trade 
Commission could not observe it; ITC (2002) used cost structure comparison estimates to 
generate a proxy for the difference between domestic and foreign flag price level. The goal of 
this study is to estimate said change in price level due to the Jones Act using more accurate cost 
structure data, and to use the result to help us understand how the Act affects consumer welfare.  
My approach can address only a comparative static change in the equilibrium price of the 
coastal transport market (as the rest of the US economy is held constant in its current state), but 
will still facilitate the application of the newest information in generating a new understanding of 
my basic question. In order to visualize the intuition behind the policy shock in question, and 
what I seek to quantify, let us consider the following graphical illustration.  
The figures below depict an exogenously determined „world‟ price of transport, not 
impacted by prices in the comparatively miniscule domestic trade, being allowed to enter into the 
domestic market.  
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Given the assumption that foreign-flag and domestic shipping are perfect substitutes, the 
world price level would supplant the level currently charged by domestic firms if the Jones Act 
were to be repealed. The industry‟s new equilibrium output would be given by the intersection of 
the rightward shifting domestic trade Supply Curve and the original Demand Curve at the World 
price point. The difference in equilibrium quantities between the current market and those in a 
repeal scenario would illustrate the policy shock‟s affect upon consumer and producer surplus 
(economic welfare).  However, since the magnitude of a supply curve shift cannot be feasibly 
estimated with available data, I focus on quantifying the lower-bound increase in consumer 
surplus. Graphically, the (minimal) new level of consumer surplus is shown by the area (in blue) 
under the original demand curve and above the prevailing World price at the original level of 
output. Mathematically, this is given simply as: 
 
          (P Domestic – P World)(Q Domestic) 
  
It is now necessary to quantify each of these parameters. Q Domestic is readily 
observable/computable in terms of ton-mile output, and so is P Domestic.  As discussed before, P 
World is not. Estimating it (and thus establishing a differential that captures the price level impact 
of repealing the Jones Act) using newly available comparative profit and cost structure data is 
the main task and contribution of this study. 
I proceed with the argument that an examination of the operating profit structures of 
Jones Act and Foreign Flag firms can achieve the best insight into the formation of their relative 
price levels when they cannot be directly observed. However, operating costs are considered to 
be the maritime shipping industry‟s greatest trade secret, and there is little available data-and 
correspondingly little economic literature- on the subject. Fortunately there is, thanks to the 
efforts of PwC & MARAD (2011), information on the relative magnitudes of operating cost 
structure components for foreign-flag vs. domestic firms. This insight will be the key to 
unlocking a P World  estimate by comparing financial identities and the market information 
contained in them.  
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
For the sake of clarity, I begin this section by providing a walkthrough of the steps taken 
that lead to estimates of world price and potential impacts upon consumer surplus. This is 
followed by a description of each of the individual parameters used (and their values), as well as 
a presentation of the results yielded by my analysis. 
In general terms, I use the definition of two observable quantities (Gross Profit Margin 
from Operations for each sector) to pinpoint the value of one unknown quantity (the Price Level 
charged by foreign flag firms). Gross Profit Margin from Operations (GPMO) for each sector are 
defined by the following identity equations, which allow me to frame the unknown variable of 
interest  - Marginal Revenue (Price) Foreign – as a component existing in an observable market 
statistic: 
 
GPMO Jones Act = Marginal Revenue (Price) Jones Act –(Y*)(Operating Cost Per Unit Foreign     
           Marginal Revenue (Price) Jones Act 
 
 
GPMO Foreign = Marginal Revenue (Price) Foreign – (Operating Cost Per Unit) Foreign     
           Marginal Revenue (Price) Foreign 
 
From here, it becomes a matter of quantifying each of the other observable components and then 
applying algebra to solve for the global price level per ton-mile (Marginal Revenue (Price) 
Foreign )  that allows these identities to hold.   
The general intuition behind this process is that: since I can know the operating profit 
margin of Jones Act firms, the price that these firms charge, and relatively how much more 
expensive it is to provide a ton-mile of service in this market than in global trade, I can thus infer 
the actual average operating costs per ton-mile for the global trade. With this at hand, it is only a 
matter of seeing what average price level foreign firms are charging in order to generate their 
operating profit margin.    
The identity equations are populated with the following data: 
 
GPMO Jones Act = .1680 . 
 
This represents the industry average profit margin (for the years 2007-2011) from 
operations for Jones Act firms, as collected and aggregated for the use of the Investment & 
Commercial Banking industries by the Risk Management Association:  
 
GPMO Foreign = .1745   
 
This value represents my own estimation of the industry standard profit margin from 
operations for foreign-flag vessels; the calculation was obtained by taking yearly earnings (2007-
12) from operations before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization “EBITDA” and 
dividing that term by gross revenue from operations for ten of the world‟s largest foreign flag 
shipping companies. The four dry bulk/container carriers (AP Moller/Maersk, NYK, Evergreen, 
and CSCL) and six tanker carriers (Frontline, MOL, Euronav, MISC, and HMM) were chosen to 
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coincide with the composition of the fleet currently serving the demands of the Jones Act trade: 
~40% dry bulk/container ships,  ~ 60% tanker ships
20
.  
 
Y*= 2.7 
 
This coefficient represents how much greater per unit operating costs are for US-flag 
vessels
21
 than for Foreign Flag vessels. PwC & MARAD, 2011 generated this by aggregating 
previously discussed operating cost disclosures.  
 
Marginal Revenue (Price) Jones Act = $.003882 per ton/mile  
 
This value represents the Jones Act trade‟s industry average price of transport per 
ton/mile for the years 2007-2010 (the last available year). I accessed Total Revenue from 
Operations data from the Risk Management Association for the period, which was then divided 
into The Army Corps of Engineers “Waterborne Commerce of the United States” total ton/miles 
of output per year for the industry. The per year ton/mile rates were then averaged into the figure 
above. 
 
With these values inserted, there is now: 
 
.1680= $.003882 – 2.7(Operating Cost Per Unit)  
   $.003882 
and 
 
.1745= Marginal Revenue (Price) Foreign – (Operating Cost Per Unit)  
      Marginal Revenue (Price) Foreign  
 
Solving for Operating Cost Per Unit in the first (Jones Act profit structure) equation, I obtain:  
$.001196, an estimate of the Operating Cost per Ton-Mile for Foreign Flag ships. This 
can now be inserted into the second (Foreign Flag profit structure) equation and used to solve for 
Marginal Revenue (Price) Foreign, yielding a value of $.0014488: an estimate of the aggregate 
price level per ton-mile for unregulated, Foreign-Flag transport.  
A comparison with the aggregate price level per ton-mile for Jones Act transport 
($.0014488  vs.  $.003882) suggests that domestic cabotage services would be approximately 
61% cheaper if the Jones Act were to be repealed.  Applying this to the Partial Equilibrium 
analysis, a lower-bound estimate for the gains to consumer surplus can be calculated as: 
 
($.003882 - $.0014488) (237,694,000,000) = $578,357,040.8 per year. 
It can also be useful to see how this result would differ if some of the model‟s key assumptions 
were altered. For instance: 
 
                                                        
20
 See Appendices 1 and 2 for the complete dataset. 
21
 Note: The Jones Act build requirement imposes higher capital costs, not operating costs. As 
such, this increased expenditure level is captured in domestic firms‟ price levels as a contribution 
to overhead/capital payments. 
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 If the actual value of Y* -operating cost differential- were to be either 25% larger or 
smaller than the figure I incorporate, the estimates of price differential and lower bound 
consumer welfare gain would thus be: (70.0%, $646 million/yr) and (50.1%, $461 
million/year) respectively.  
 If the value of GPMO Foreign were to be either 25% larger or smaller than what my own 
estimates indicate, the estimates of price differential and lower bound consumer welfare 
gain would then be: (60.5%, $559 million/yr) and (64.5%, $596 million/yr) respectively.  
 
This demonstrates that, even if the two component values that are the most prone to variation
22
 
take on values that vary by 25% in either direction, the estimates price level and welfare due to 
the Jones Act remain significantly large. 
With this in mind, I now consider the question of what a more precise estimate of the 
actual value of consumer surplus gains might be. My method is confined by its ability to 
generate only a lower bound value, but it is very reasonable to anticipate that a decrease in the 
price level of cabotage would indeed result in an increase in the industry‟s equilibrium quantity 
of demand and supply. However, by combining my findings with (ITC, 2002)‟s comparative 
static estimates I can more reasonably address the change in quantities that may result from my 
estimated change in price level. (ITC, 2002)‟s assessment implies an elasticity of demand of -.59 
for the domestic cabotage market,
23
 and when this is applied to my study‟s lower bound results, 
the new equilibrium quantity of output resulting from a repeal of the Jones Act can be estimated 
as being 36% higher (.61*.59= .36) at a value of 323,263,840,000 ton-miles per year. From here, 
a more precise estimate of changes to consumer welfare can be calculated
24
 as: 
 
[P(Q0 Jones Act) + ½ (Q1 Jones Act - Q0 Jones Act)P] = $682,461,308.1 per year. 
 
V.  Discussion 
 
The primary purpose of this result is to help us better understand the Jones Act‟s costs 
and benefits. While a full cost-benefit analysis is outside the scope of my analysis, the results it 
arrives at are beneficial. According to my findings, repealing the Jones Act would result in a 
minimum gain of approximately $578 million to domestic consumer surplus/economic welfare. 
Meaning: even if there were no change in equilibrium coastal shipping demand and supply, 
consumers would save  $578 million annually purchasing the same services that they already 
do.
25
 Additionally, this welfare gain could very reasonably be as high as $682 million a year 
when taking into account what is known about this industry‟s demand elasticity. Though both of 
                                                        
22
 The data in (RMA, 2011) shows that GPMO Jones Act varies considerably less from year to year 
than does GPMO Foreign.  
23
 They estimate that a 12.0% increase in output results from a 20.4% decrease in price level. 
24
 This expression simply accounts for the additional gains to consumer surplus resulting from a 
change in quantity demanded, where the second term represents its triangular area below the 
demand curve (bounded by the original supply curve and the difference in equilibrium 
quantities).     
25
 Though I am unable to provide an estimate of how much Quantity Demanded would change in 
this scenario, I assume (according to the Law of Demand) that Price Level and Demand for a 
good are inversely related.  
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these figures are miniscule when viewed next to the output of the entire US economy ($15.29 
trillion) they are significant in terms of their respective market; even the lower-bound value of 
estimated yearly savings amounts to over 30% of the current annual output of the Jones Act trade 
(CIA, 2012 and RMA, 2011). 
While this paper is the first to successfully apply accurate cost structure differential data 
in generating an estimate of the Jones Act‟s effect on price, there are some notable caveats to its 
results and my to approach in general. Ideally, a CGE model -containing specific input cost 
information for each industry-could have been constructed and used to examine meaningful 
effects beyond those related to consumer welfare. There thus remain some important missing 
pieces that my results do not directly address, and the conclusions that can be drawn from them 
are likewise limited in scope. 
Firstly, my approach does not incorporate the concept of elasticity. I cannot estimate 
changes in the equilibrium quantity of demand and output due to a change in price, which is why 
only a lower-bound consumer welfare effect is addressed and why a past estimate of demand 
elasticity is parsed in to provide additional perspective. Also, due to my Partial Equilibrium 
framework that examines only the marine shipping industry, the rest of the economy is held 
constant. Because of this, I cannot properly investigate important questions such as:  
 
 How might a decrease in the price of coastal transport affect the prices of other goods?   
 What kind of substitution effects would occur with competing modes (truck and rail)? 
 How would employment in the domestic merchant marine trades change due to an influx 
of foreign competition? 
  
Additionally, there is the nature of my dataset. For the most part, each component used in 
my analysis is based upon aggregated information, which does not capture route, commodity, or 
seasonally specific characteristics for each transportation sub-market. I also assume that industry 
profit margins and relative costs of inputs do not fluctuate with time. However, since each 
component of my dataset was averaged over a 5 year time span, my framework should be 
sufficiently representative of general industry conditions.  
 The above notwithstanding, my findings are based on newly available information and 
do provide a meaningful insight into the most fundamental economic consequence of this 
longstanding legislation. We are now able to see the Jones Act‟s price level and consumer 
welfare effect more clearly within the Act‟s broader context.  
Let us re-consider the Jones Act‟s original goal of fostering a domestic merchant marine. 
Pro-cabotage groups (such as the Maritime Cabotage Task Force and the International Seafarer‟s 
Union it primarily represents) often cite that the law does indeed ensure the existence of a high 
paying, domestic trade in the way it prohibits foreign flag competition. These groups with such a 
strong vested interest in preserving the Jones Act have been successful in combating repeal 
attempts steered by politicians (especially from HI and AK) seeking to increase economic 
welfare of their constituents; both the first major cabotage liberalization push of the mid 1990‟s 
as well as the Open America ‟s Waters Act of 2010 (introduced by Sen. John McCain) were 
tabled before ever making it to the Congressional floor for debate. Unless a more widespread 
public awareness/interest for this issue is fostered, it is perhaps unlikely that a proposal to 
liberalize America‟s coastal waterways will gain significant ground. Notwithstanding the 
obstacles posed by the political status quo (and the lack of a complete body of knowledge on the 
subject of the Jones Act), there remains significant evidence suggesting that America‟s current 
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marine transport infrastructure may be sub-optimal. Smith (2004) and others have demonstrated 
the almost exponential decline in US merchant marine employment since the legislation was 
implemented, and that instead of fostering a domestic marine shipping infrastructure the Jones 
Act has actually crippled it, leaving in place only the means to meet the demand of shippers 
using cabotage services out of necessity.  
An additional component of marine infrastructure the Act aims to protect is the domestic 
shipbuilding industry. However, ITC (2002) showed that even if the Jones Act were to be 
repealed, and firms were no longer required to operate domestically built vessels, the US 
shipbuilding industry would not be significantly affected since the vast majority of its output is 
tied to government contracts.  
This is not to say that there would not be any economic “losers” were the Jones Act to be 
repealed. Of greatest concern is the likelihood that domestic employment in the coastal seafaring 
trade suffer a dramatic decrease; if (ITC, 2002)‟s estimates are of any indication, employment in 
this sector would decrease by 84.1% and result in the loss of over 13,600 jobs
26
 (Statistical 
Snapshot, 2011). However, (taking into account just the lower bound estimate of gains to 
consumer welfare) citizens would have to value each of these 13,600 jobs as being worth over 
$42,500 greater than what they already pay in order for the minimum gain to consumer welfare 
to be offset
27
.      
The remainder of the (albeit small) amount of complementary research points toward the 
overall infrastructure being poised to benefit from a repeal as well.  
Consider the following: 
 
 
 
                                                         US Waterborne Transport Statistical Snapshot, 2011 
Inland Waterways refers to the “barging” trade: a strong competitor with trucking and rail, 
and generally considered to be healthy (Lane, 2011). The employment and output in this sector 
would not likely be significantly affected as a result of coastal cabotage liberalization, as it 
services routes within the interior of the United States (ITC, 2002).  
                                                        
26
 .841* 16,200 (Current Coastal Seafaring Employment in the US) = 13,625 
27
 $578,000,000 in additional economic value divided by 13,600 jobs  $42,500 per job 
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Magee (2002) hypothesizes that repealing the Jones Act would result in a substantial 
increase in the size of the Port Services sector. This idea is quite intuitive; if foreign-flag ships 
were allowed to transport cargo between US ports (e.g., unload in New Orleans and then move 
on to Boston) their routes could be modified to include multiple stops instead of just one. 
Considering the massive economies of scale present in international shipping operations 
(especially when the widening of the Panama Canal to accommodate even larger vessels is 
complete) there would likely be substitution effects where sea transport supplants truck & rail for 
some domestic routes. Economic intuition follows that increased port infrastructure and 
employment could result naturally from the need to accommodate more geographically varied 
routes. It may thus be feasible that repealing the Jones Act could affect a shift from seafaring 
coastal jobs to those that are port-based, and that the quantity demanded of coastal transport 
could significantly increase from the current status quo – and with it consumer welfare. However, 
this is far from certain. An in-depth analysis of how US Supply Chain infrastructure might 
respond to a liberation of cabotage would be an extremely useful tool for policymakers seeking 
to best guide the future of the US merchant marine. 
As a final thought, it is worth acknowledging the case of the European Union (EU). 
Beginning in the 1990‟s, it began an ongoing process of liberating the market for ocean transport 
that included the repeal of cabotage laws among member nations. The main rationale for this 
program continues to be to facilitate  “ a more balanced use of transport modes based on their 
own merits rather than on historically different administrative formalities… (that) will be 
beneficial for the environment
28
 and for the economy” (Europa, 2009). Though the geographic, 
political, and economic environment in the EU differs from that in the United States, the goal of 
optimizing the efficiency of transport infrastructure is shared. What has been- and continues to 
be- learned about the Jones Act‟s long-term consequences might indicate that pursuing such a 
process may also be logical for the United States.     
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VII. Appendix 1: Foreign Flag Profit Structure Data 
Firm & Year Gross Profit 
From 
Operations 
Total 
Operating 
Revenue 
 Gross Profit 
Margin from 
Operations 
Average Gross 
Profit Margin from 
Operations 
Industry Average 
Profit Margin from 
Operations 
AP 
Moller/Maersk 
(in million 
DKK) 
(in million 
DKK) 
 0.240400124 0.174502138 
2007 64711 278872 0.232045526   
2008 81250 311821 0.260566158   
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2009 48968 260026 0.18831963   
2010 89088 315396 0.28246395   
2011 76955 322520 0.238605358   
      
NYK Line (in million 
Yen) 
(in million 
Yen) 
 0.092579409  
2007 185428 2164279 0.085676569   
2008 294479 2584626 0.113934859   
2009 245038 2429972 0.100839845   
2010 79925 1697342 0.04708833   
2011 222544 1929169 0.115357441   
      
Evergreen 
Marine 
(in million 
Taiwan 
Dollars)  
(in million 
Taiwan 
Dollars) 
 0.103217335  
2007 4564019 27844435 0.163911352   
2008 1557350 22437412 0.069408629   
2009 1987591 15162947 0.131082104   
2010 1773310 17026011 0.104152993   
2011 730144 15361235 0.047531595   
      
CSCL (in million 
RMB) 
(in million 
RMB) 
 -0.030996517  
2007 4296016 38825620 0.110648999   
2008 367428 34756152 0.010571596   
2009 -6231995 19740331 -0.315698607   
2010 4466298 34808706 0.128309797   
2011 -2508695 28246498 -0.088814373   
      
Teekay (in thousand 
USD) 
(in 
thousand 
USD) 
   
2007 739238 2395507 0.308593546 0.275416618  
2008 634524 3193655 0.198682701   
2009 606964 2181605 0.278219018   
2010 674828 2095753 0.321997869   
2011 526720 1953782 0.269589954   
 
Appendix 1: Foreign Flag Profit Structure Data Cont. 
 
Frontline (in thousand 
USD) 
(in 
thousand 
USD) 
 0.339037908  
2007 738829 1299927 0.568361916   
2008 1073999 2104018 0.510451431   
2009 477423 1133286 0.421273183   
2010 520763 1165215 0.446924387   
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2011 -204001 810102 -0.251821376   
      
MOL (in million 
Yen) 
(in million 
Yen) 
 0.153342982  
2007 268397 1568435 0.171124082   
2008 401588 1945967 0.206369378   
2009 301316 1865802 0.161494092   
2010 119486 1347965 0.088641767   
2011 214701 1543661 0.139085589   
      
Euronav (in thousand 
USD) 
(in 
thousand 
USD) 
 0.553431063  
2007 296143 530937 0.557774275   
2008 612996 856309 0.715858411   
2009 248323 461285 0.538328799   
2010 285548 525075 0.543823263   
2011 162268 394457 0.411370568   
      
MISC (in thousand 
RM) 
(in 
thousand 
RM) 
 -0.026090428  
2007 532669 4355482 0.122298519   
2008 567568 5652986 0.100401452   
2009 -560382 6093712 -0.091960697   
2010 -702737 4159477 -0.168948404   
2011 -331174 3590234 -0.092243013   
      
HMM (in million 
KRW) 
(in million 
KRW) 
 0.044682886  
2007 424000 5091884 0.083269768   
2008 717349 8003038 0.089634586   
2009 -445336 6115482 -0.072821079   
2010 946255 8124208 0.116473507   
2011 50889 7420767 0.006857647   
 
 
 
VIII.  Appendix 2: Jones Act Market Statistics 
 
 
 Coastal Ton-
Miles 
   
2007 228052000000    
2008 207877000000    
2009 196290000000    
2010 192348000000    
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 Lakes Ton-Miles    
2007 51893000000    
2008 50263000000    
2009 33509000000    
2010 45346000000    
     
 Jones Act Ton-
Miles 
Jones Act Operating 
Revenue 
  Yearly Jones Act Ton-Mile Rates 
2007 279945000000 618380000  0.002208934 
2008 258140000000 826546000  0.003201929 
2009 229799000000 904061000  0.003934138 
2010 237694000000 1469650000  0.00618295 
     
    Industry Average Jones Act Ton-
Mile Rate 
    0.003881988 
 
 
  
 
